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Year	 #	of	attacks		 #	of	deaths		 #	of	wounded	
1993	 0	 0	 0	
1994	 1	 7	 500	
1995	 6	 14	 5,503	
1996	 0	 0	 0	
1997	 0	 0	 0	










































Economics	and	“Cultural”	Violence.	(University of California International and Area Studies 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Year	 Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded	
2001	 39	 136	 791	
2002	 34	 207	 729	
2003		 39	 131	 344	
2004	(removal)	 19	 49	 125	
2005	 22	 16	 21	
2006	 27	 13	 31	





































































































































































































































































































































Year		 Attacks		 Deaths		 Wounded		
1997	 16	 127	 14	
1998	 11	 27	 37	
1999		 46	 105	 233	
2000	 3	 4	 2	
2001	 2	 7	 4	
2002	 0	 0	 0	
















































Year	 Attacks	 Killed		 Wounded	
2012	 43	 232	 390	
2013	 21	 14	 14	
2014	 66	 23	 41	
2015	 337	 424	 840	





























































































































































































































































































































































































Year		 #	of	Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded		
2009	 65	 352	 492	
2010	 103	 445	 812	
2011	(before)	 28	 395	 359	
2011	(after)	 60	 350	 730	
2012	 522	 1,919	 3,447	
2013	 247	 795	 1,454	











































Year		 #	of	Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded		
2009	 19	 161	 382	







2012	 120	 430	 947	
2013	 77	 347	 814	



















Year	 Attacks		 Deaths		 Wounded		
2009	 32	 154	 75	
2010	 17	 41	 74	
2011	(before)	 10	 41	 44	
2011	(after)	 9	 6	 13	
2012	 12	 9	 22	
2013	 18	 48	 50	
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David	Hoffman’s	scale	of	Charismatic	Authority252	
1. Is	the	authority	of	the	leader	interpreted	in	terms	of	ingrained	and	traditional	
conceptions	of	charismatic	authority	in	the	broader	society	and	culture?	
2. Is	authority	attributed	to	the	leaders	on	the	basis	of	the	perception	that	there	is	an	
impending	or	current	crisis,	one	associated	with	the	bankruptcy	of	existing	forms	of	
traditional	and/or	rational-legal	forms	of	authority?	
3. Are	attributions	of	power	to	the	leader	based	on	the	follower’s	perception	of	the	
leader’s	superhuman	and/or	exceptional	powers	and	qualities?	
4. Is	the	authority	attributed	to	the	leader	associated	with	any	physical	impairment	or	
suffering	viewed	positively	by	the	followers?		
5. Does	the	leader	legitimate	their	authority	through	reference	to	a	higher	source	of	
authority,	either	divine	or	some	other	transcendent	source	(i.e.	a	supreme	
ideology)?		
6. Are	grandiose	and	exaggerated	claims	made	about	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	
leader’s	authority	and	importance?		
7. Are	new	members	socialized	into	recognizing	the	special	powers	and	authority	of	
the	leader?	
8. Does	the	leader	figure	prominently	in	the	folklore	of	the	group	and	the	
representation	of	its	“story”?	
9. Are	the	organization’s	decisions	highly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	will	of	the	
leader?		
																																								 																					
252	Hoffman,	“Quantifying	and	Qualifying	Charisma,”	716-717.	
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10. Is	the	leader	intolerant	of	alternative	sources	of	power	and	authority,	both	internal	
and	external	to	the	group?		
11. Does	the	leader	introduce	sudden	and/or	seemingly	arbitrary	changes	in	the	
practices	and	policies	of	the	group?	
12. Do	followers	readily	accept	these	sudden	and/or	seemingly	arbitrary	changes	in	the	
practices	and	policies	of	the	group?	
13. Is	the	delegation	of	authority	highly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	will	of	the	leader?	
14. Does	the	legitimacy	of	subordinate	leaders	in	the	group	depend	on	the	nature	of	
their	personal	relationship	with	the	leader?		
Charismatic	Authority	of	Shoko	Asahara253	
1.	Yes.	This	criteria	is	easily	fulfilled	by	Shoko	Asahara.	Shoko	Asahara	was	
completely	blind	in	one	eye	and	partially	blind	in	the	other.	He	used	disability	to	
substantiate	his	claim	that	his	vision	was	not	like	that	of	ordinary	men	but	divine	in	its	
nature.	This	allowed	him	to	see	into	the	future	and	determine	what	the	divine	plan	for	the	
world	was	and	how	his	followers	could	achieve	enlightenment.	Members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	
believed	that	Shoko	Asahara	occupied	a	higher	dimensional	existence,	making	him	the	solo	
individual	who	could	provide	spiritual	fulfillment.		
2.	Sort	of.	This	might	be	the	weakest	aspect	of	Shoko	Asahara’s	charismatic	
authority,	but	there	are	clear	efforts	on	his	part	to	ground	his	own	charismatic	authority	in	
more	traditional	conceptions	of	charismatic	authority.	For	example,	Shoko	Asahara	
barrowed	heavily	from	Buddhist	practices	and	even	claimed	he	was	the	first	enlightened	
																																								 																					
253	Information	to	complete	the	scale	was	compiled	from	Mark	Juergensmeyer	Terror	in	the	Mind	
of	God,	(University	of	California	Press:	2003)	103-120.	
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one	to	be	born	on	earth	since	Buddha	himself.	This	practice	allowed	Shoko	Asahara	to	
coopt	the	authority	of	Buddhism,	which	was	very	popular	in	Japanese	culture	to	grant	his	
organization	more	legitimacy.		
3.	Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	was	brilliant	at	exploited	disillusionment	among	individuals	
to	increase	his	own	authority	over	his	members.	The	time	when	Aum	Shinrikyo	
membership	was	most	actively	growing	was	also	during	an	economic	boom	in	Japan.	While	
this	rapid	economic	growth	brought	many	benefits	to	Japan,	it	also	prompted	vast	cultural	
change	that	left	many	young	Japanese	people	disillusioned.	The	pressure	of	the	economic	
rat	race	and	the	rapid	Westernization	of	Japan	sent	many	young	looking	for	spiritual	
fulfillment.	Shoko	Asahara	told	them	exactly	what	they	wanted	to	hear;	that	they	were	right	
to	be	disillusioned	because	Japanese	society	was	morally	bankrupt	and	this	corrupt	society	
would	soon	collapse.		
4.	Yes.	This	criteria	fits	perfectly	to	Shoko	Asahara.	Again,	Shoko	Asahara	was	half-
blind	but	he	turned	his	disability	into	a	key	aspect	of	his	cult-of-personality.	This	skill	came	
from	an	early	start	using	his	half-blindness	to	his	advantage.	As	a	child,	he	had	been	sent	to	
an	all	blind	school,	where	his	partial	vision	gave	him	an	advantage	over	his	peers	and	made	
him	a	natural	leader.	He	built	his	leadership	skills	as	a	child	using	his	gift	of	limited	vision	
to	manipulate	his	classmates.		
5.	Yes.	As	stated	earlier,	Shoko	Asahara	barrowed	heavily	from	traditional	Buddhist	
practices	creating	an	easy	association	between	himself	and	the	authority	of	Buddha.		
6.		Yes.	The	whole	basis	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	that	Shoko	Asahara	was	unique	
among	men	and	only	he	could	successfully	guide	people	to	enlightenment.	Many	of	the	
claims	made	about	Shoko	Asahara	such	as	the	claim	that	he	occupied	a	higher	dimensional	
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existence	that	allowed	him	to	see	into	the	future	or	the	claim	that	on	a	trip	to	Nepal	he	was	
personally	entrusted	with	a	secret	mission	from	the	Dalai	Lama	himself	are	clearly	
exaggerated	to	stress	his	importance	and	authority.		
7.		Yes.	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	very	bizarre	socialization	processes	to	get	new	members	
to	believe	in	the	special	powers	and	authority	of	Shoko	Asahara.	In	one	such	ritual,	recruits	
would	be	placed	on	lightly	vibrating	mats	and	be	given	a	tea	that	caused	them	to	
hallucinate	(it	is	suspected	that	the	tea	was	laced	with	LSD).	During	these	hallucinations	
the	recruits	were	told	to	think	of	Shoko	Asahara	because	only	through	him	could	they	avoid	
bad	visions	and	find	the	truth.	
8.	Yes.	For	Aum	Shinrikyo,	their	story	is	completely	dependent	on	Shoko	Asahara.	
Shoko	Asahara	was	the	only	member	of	the	organization	to	receive	divine	messages,	so	
only	he	could	fulfill	the	organization’s	goals.	Shoko	Asahara	purposely	designed	the	Aum	
Shinrikyo	founding	myth	with	himself	at	the	center.		
9.	Yes.	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	incredibly	centralized.	Shoko	Asahara	was	the	sole	
individual	responsible	for	the	direction	and	decisions	of	the	organization.	Everything	
produced	by	the	organization	was	designed	to	increase	Shoko	Asahara	‘sauthority	within	it.	
For	example,	all	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	advertising	publications	heavily	featured	Shoko	
Asahara	and	his	spiritual	wisdom.	The	goal	of	the	recruitment	process	was	to	attract	people	
who	already	felt	close	to	Shoko	Asahara	as	opposed	to	the	organization	at	large.	
10.	Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	always	tried	to	eliminate	opposing	sources	of	authority	both	
within	and	outside	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.	The	first	targets	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	terrorist	
activities	were	not	ordinary	citizens	of	Japan	but	fellow	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	who	
posed	a	challenge	to	Shoko	Asahara’s	authority.	Once	he	had	consolidated	his	authority	
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within	Aum	Shinrikyo,	Shoko	Asahara	moved	to	eliminate	his	main	rival	in	external	
authority,	the	Japanese	government.	He	first	attempted	to	do	this	through	elections,	but	
after	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	political	party	failed	to	win	in	parliamentary	elections,	Shoko	
Asahara	sought	to	undermine	the	authority	of	the	Japanese	government	through	terrorism.		
11.		Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	quite	frequently	changed	the	religious	practices	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo.	One	of	the	largest	and	most	dramatic	changes	he	made	to	the	organization	was	
the	introduction	of	“poa”,	which	marked	a	transition	of	the	religion	towards	violent	
fanaticism.		
12.		Yes,.Despite	Shoko	Asahara’s	frequent	changes	to	the	vision	of	Aum	Shinrikyo,	
the	religion	continued	to	grow	and	pick	up	new	members.	By	the	time	of	the	Tokyo	subway	
attack,	the	group	held	over	40,000	members.	The	lack	of	an	exodus	from	the	organization	
during	major	changes	to	its	religious	philosophy	highlights	just	how	strong	Shoko	
Asahara’s	charismatic	appeal	in	Aum	Shinrikyo	was.		
13.		Yes.		All	of	the	top	positions	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	were	filled	by	members	who	had	
close	personal	relationships	with	Shoko	Asahara	and	deeply	believed	in	his	divine	nature.	
Shoko	Asahara	was	so	effective	in	centralizing	his	authority	that	after	he	was	captured,	the	
secondary	leaders	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	found	their	authority	over	individual	members	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	deeply	degraded.	To	counteract	this,	some	secondary	leaders	isolated	members	
of	Aum	Shinrikyo	from	the	news	that	Shoko	Asahara	had	been	arrested	because	they	knew	
if	the	rank	and	file	found	out	they	would	lose	their	authority.		
	 14.	Yes.	As	said	in	criteria	13,	all	of	the	top	leaders	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	held	close	
personal	relationships	with	Shoko	Asahara.	This	cemented	Shoko	Asahara’s	authority	at	
the	top	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.	
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Charismatic	Authority	of	Ahmed	Yassin254	
1. Yes.	Yassin	drew	heavily	from	traditional	notions	of	Islamic	authority	to	enhance	his	
own	standing	within	Hamas.		
2. Yes.	The	presence	of	Israel	and	the	loss	of	Palestinian	land	was	used	as	a	
justification	for	Yassin’s	authority.		
3. Yes.	Among	the	followers	of	Hamas	there	was	a	feeling	that	Yassin	was	unnaturally	
wise.		
4. Yes.	Yassin	was	paralyzed	from	the	waist	down	and	had	been	since	he	was	sixteen,	
but	he	used	this	physical	impairment	to	enhance	his	own	cult-of-authority.		
5. Yes.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Yassin	drew	heavily	from	the	traditional	authority	of	
Islam	by	living	very	piously	and	modestly.		
6. Yes.	He	was	given	the	title	of	the	spiritual	leader	of	Hamas	and	he	was	considered	
essential	to	the	organization.		
7. No.	Although	Yassin	was	recognized	as	a	leader	of	Hamas	and	beloved	for	his	
spiritual	wisdom,	there	was	not	a	method	through	which	individual	recruits	were	
socialized	to	his	authority.		
																																								 																					
254	Information	for	scale	compiled	from	Matthew	Levitt	“Hamas:	politics,	charity,	and	
terrorism	in	the	service	of	Jihad,”	(Yale	University	Press:	2006),	34-37.	And	Khaled	Hroub	
“Hamas	after	Shaykh	Yasin	and	Rantisi,”	Journal	of	Palestinian	Studies,	Vol.	33	No.	4,	
Summer	2004,	21-38.		
	
	
	
	
	 107	
8. Yes.	He	did	feature	very	proximately	in	the	story	of	Hamas.	However,	he	was	not	the	
only	figure	to	do	so,	and	he	did	not	attempt	to	rewrite	the	story	of	Hamas	to	just	be	
centered	around	himself.		
9. No.	Hamas	is	a	networked	organization	and,	at	the	local	level,	the	authority	of	the	
central	leadership	was	significantly	less	important	than	the	will	and	connections	of	
the	local	leader.		
10. No.	There	was	a	wide	variety	of	other	sources	of	authority	within	Hamas	that	Yassin	
tolerated.	Even	within	the	central	leadership,	Yassin	competed	with	other	leaders.		
11. No,	Although	Hamas	would	change	its	positions	on	issues,	decisions	were	reached	
through	consensus	within	the	organization’s	leadership	rather	than	the	arbitrary	
will	of	one	leader.		
12. No.	
13. No.	Again	the	structure	of	Hamas	was	really	focused	on	consensus	building	as	
opposed	to	centralization.		
14. No.	It	was	more	important	for	leaders	to	have	a	network	within	their	community	
than	it	was	for	them	to	have	a	strong	personal	relationship	with	the	central	
leadership.				
Charismatic	Authority	of	Abdullah	Öcalan255	
1. Yes.	Öcalan’s	authority	was	derived	from	Kurdish	culture	and	he	established	his	
organization	to	take	advantage	of	these	ideas.		
																																								 																					
255	Information	for	this	scale	compiled	from	Özlem	Pusane	“Turkey’s	Military	Victory	over	
the	PKK	and	its	Failure	to	End	the	PKK	Insurgency.”	Middle	Eastern	Studies,	Vol.	51,	No.	5,	
2015,	727-741.	
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2. Yes.	Öcalan’s	organization	effectively	used	the	repression	of	the	Kurdish	people	by	
the	Turkish	government	and	the	desire	of	the	Kurdish	people	for	a	Kurdish	state	to	
enhance	his	own	authority.		
3. Yes.	Öcalan	was	not	simply	the	leader	of	a	liberation	movement;	he	became	the	idea	
of	Kurdish	liberation	for	many	of	the	followers	of	the	PKK.	He	was	viewed	as	the	
father	of	the	modern	Kurdish	nation.		
4. No.	
5. Yes.	Öcalan	borrowed	heavily	from	the	ideas	of	nationhood	and	nationalism	to	
enhance	his	own	authority	within	the	PKK.		
6. Yes.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Öcalan	came	to	be	viewed	as	the	father	of	the	Kurdish	
nation	and	was	viewed	as	a	messiah	figure.		
7. Sort	of.	There	was	less	of	an	emphasis	on	recognizing	the	special	powers	of	Öcalan	
but	the	PKK	was	very	picky	when	it	came	to	recruiting	fighters.	One	of	its	criteria	for	
fighters	was	how	deferential	they	were	to	authority.		
8. Yes.	Öcalan	was	not	the	sole	founder	of	the	PKK,	but	he	fixed	that	by	purging	his	
fellow	co-founders	and	consolidating	the	group’s	story	behind	him.		
9. Yes.	The	organization	of	the	PKK	was	incredibly	centralized	with	all	decisions	
flowing	from	Öcalan	down.	Other	leaders	within	the	PKK	were	simply	there	to	
execute	the	will	of	the	leader.		
10. Yes.	Öcalan	was	incredibly	intolerant	of	individuals	within	the	PKK	who	threatened	
his	authority.	He	conducted	frequent	purges	within	the	organization	to	ensure	that	
leaders	could	not	establish	their	own	following	within	the	organization	and	his	
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purges	were	notorious	for	targeting	even	those	who	were	close	to	him.	He	even	
tried	to	have	his	own	wife	assassinated.		
11. Yes.	Although	he	wasn’t	officially	its	leader	at	the	time,	his	decision	to	switch	tactics	
to	negotiating	with	the	Turkish	state	after	being	captured	illustrates	how	strong	his	
charismatic	authority	was	within	the	organization.		
12. 	Yes.		
13. Yes.	As	stated	earlier	other	leaders	within	the	PKK	were	transactional,	functioning	
as	tools	to	execute	the	will	of	Öcalan.		
14. Yes.	The	other	leaders	within	the	PKK	all	relied	on	their	personal	relation	with	
Öcalan	to	gain	their	positions,	and	when	that	relationship	deteriorated,	they	were	
quickly	purged.		
Charismatic	Authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden256	
1. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	barrowed	heavily	from	Islamic	cultures	and	practices	to	
enhance	his	own	charismatic	authority.	He	was	very	conscious	about	presenting	
himself	as	an	excellent	and	devout	Muslim.		
2. Yes.	The	basis	for	Al	Qaeda	was	that	Middle	Eastern	regimes	were	secular	and	did	
not	represent	the	values	of	Islam.	This	dissatisfaction	with	traditional	society	led	
individuals	to	Al	Qaeda.	
3. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	had	distinguished	himself	in	the	Soviet	Afghan	war	as	a	
military	commander.	He	quickly	built	up	a	myth	about	his	leadership	abilities.		
																																								 																					
256	Information	for	this	scale	compiled	from	Peter	Bergen	and	Paul	Cruickshank	“Revisiting	the	
Early	Al	Qaeda:	An	Updated	Account	of	its	Formative	Years,”	Studies	in	Conflict	and	
Terrorism,	Vol.	35,	2012,	1-36.	And	Rohan	Gunaratna	and	Aviv	Oreg	“Al	Qaeda’s	
Organizational	Structure	and	its	Evolution,”	Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism,	Vol.	33,	2010,	
1043-1078.	
	
	 110	
4. No.	Unlike	some	charismatic	leaders,	Osama	Bin	Laden	did	not	use	a	physical	
disability	as	a	means	to	enhance	his	charismatic	authority.		
5. Yes,.Osama	Bin	Laden	frequently	paid	homage	to	traditional	Islamic	authority	as	a	
way	to	enhance	his	own	authority	within	Al	Qaeda.		
6. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	was	frequently	claimed	to	be	the	only	figure	in	the	Arab	world	
who	could	defeat	the	West.		
7. Sort	of.	There	was	less	an	emphasis	on	individual	members	being	socialized	but	a	
greater	emphasis	on	existing	organizations	that	were	incorporated	into	Al	Qaeda	
recognizing	the	supreme	authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden.			
8. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	founded	Al	Qaeda	with	his	own	capital.	He	was	essential	to	
the	story	of	the	group.		
9. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	was	the	ultimate	authority	within	Al	Qaeda.	He	dictated	the	
direction	and	goals	of	the	organization	to	underlings	who	worked	to	fulfill	his	
wishes.		
10. Yes.	Although	there	were	other	leaders	within	Al	Qaeda,	they	were	all	secondary	to	
Osama	Bin	Laden	and	decisions	by	other	leaders	always	had	to	be	justified	in	terms	
of	what	Bin	Laden	wanted.		
11. Yes.	The	switch	of	Al	Qaeda	from	trying	to	overthrow	Arab	regimes	to	targeting	
Western	countries	is	a	good	example.		
12. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	effectively	reorganized	the	priorities	of	Al	Qaeda	without	
losing	the	faith	of	the	members	of	the	organization.		
13. Yes.	The	organization	of	Al	Qaeda	was	incredibly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	
authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
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14. Yes.	All	of	the	upper	level	leaders	within	Al	Qaeda	had	close	personal	relationships	
with	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
Criteria	for	High	Levels	of	Institutionalization257	
1. Do	the	structures	in	place	in	the	organization	reduce	uncertainty	during	an	external	
shock?	
2. How	well	known	is	the	structure	of	the	organization	to	its	individual	members?	
3. How	many	resources	does	the	organization	have	at	its	disposal?	
4. Are	there	effective	lines	of	secure	communication	within	the	organization?	
5. Does	the	organization	have	access	to	external	forms	of	legitimacy?	
6. Does	the	organization	have	access	to	internal	forms	of	legitimacy?	
7. How	effectively	is	the	organization	able	to	recruit	members?	
8. Is	the	organization	able	to	maintain	complex	linkages	between	different	actors?	
9. How	well	integrated	is	the	organization?	
10. How	strong	is	the	motivation	of	individuals	within	the	organization	to	work	toward	its	
goals.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																					
257	These	criteria	were	inspired	by	Rene	Bakker,	Jörg	Raab,	and	Brinton	Milward,	“A	
preliminary	theory	of	dark	networks	resilience.”	Journal	of	Policy	Analysis	and	Management,	
Vol.	31,	No.	1,	Winter	2012,	33-62.		
